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"Stone walls do not a prison make,  
Nor iron bars a cage; 
Minds innocent and quiet take 
That for an hermitage".   
                                       Richard Lovelace, To Althea, From Prison (1642). 
 
Though the study of prison literature has been well-established the philosophical 
study of texts written by or about imprisoned philosophers is astonishingly 
undeveloped. This is a regrettable neglect since, from Socrates, Cicero, and Boethius 
down to Bertrand Russell, Antonio Gramsci and Toni Negri, the history of thought 
has been marked either by imprisonment or by executions of philosophers. Many 
works have been written by or about philosophers literally placed in a dys-topos, i.e. 
the prison cell, either to be later released or executed. An interest in such works not 
only from the prism of their argumentation but also from the prism of the 
spatiotemporal framing of their argumentation and the socio-political context of their 
elaboration heightens philosophical insight and sheds light on the positioning of the 
philosopher in the world. Philosophy thus emerges, amongst other things, as reflection 
on the distance between thought and reality, critical subjectivity and consolidated 
sociality. The scholars who have joined this workshop (and to whom I am indebted 
and owe special thanks) investigate some of the intersections of such themes with 
prison philosophy offering valuable insights into an issue that has so far remained in 
penumbra.     
Though as such the imprisonment of the dissident is a rather invariable, unimaginative 
and flat social retaliation or a panoptical and, at times, even biopolitical (in Michel 
Foucault’s terms) mechanism of control, it has nevertheless induced imaginative, rich 
and multi-vocal philosophical responses. Outside the literal incarceration, amongst the 
related topics that a workshop about prison-philosophical-literature invokes are 
indicatively:  
- the constellation of utopics (the vision in tension with reality), topos (as 
affirmative relation to the existent), dys-topos (the apparently claustrophobic 
and nightmarish quality of the cell) and heterotopia (an ‘other’ topos rather 
than ‘no’ topos);  
- the intended – and, in this context, somewhat paradoxical – trope of the ‘echo’ 
for the voice produced in a closed space where the narcissistic musings of 
society are not quite reverberated but rather intricately re-examined, re-
shuffled or set on trial. In an interesting subversion of the myth of Narcissus 
and Echo, instead of reproducing the narcissistic voice, the echo challenges 
the kind of narcissism that is typically generated not in isolation but, on the 
contrary, in full social participation;  
- issues of marginality and exclusion also surface while the echo of the cell 
articulates a voice that the society often receives as mere noise;    
- an exploration of the heroic beyond the romanticization of the dissident or of 
the reason of her/his incarceration; 
- a possible reading of the cell as a retreat from the perspective of feminist 
utopics and of echo as a gendered voice beyond biological sex;  
- the fertilization of philosophy through ‘aversive thinking’ (to use Stanley 
Cavell’s term)1;  
- philosophical discontent opposing the speed of daily life, slowing it down, 
coupling thought with a retardation process (to employ Alain Badiou here
2
) 
and with the schole of the prison temporality; 
- the philosopher as public intellectual or a new, more ironic meaning given to 
the philosopher as a private ironist (Rorty’s term) and to philosophy deployed 
in a peculiar privacy;  
- philosophical thought provocation in provocative times; 
- the demands that transvaluation and radical change make upon the self and 
society; 
- and the plasticity of humanity that the plea for a better or perfect world 
presupposes. 
 Therefore, apart from the first-sight associations with the imprisoned philosopher and 
with the philosopher who brings to light the imprisonment of humanity, this workshop 
explores philosophy as a voice of discontent about the world as it is and as an 
invocation of the world as it could or should be. Hence, it does not concentrate only 
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on philosophers’ response to the social cost that raising such a voice often entails. It 
also points to ways in which philosophers are themselves shaped by the cell and to 
ways in which the cell can be re-configured into an interval, an islet, a locus of 
monologue that unleashes energies often obfuscated by dialogue, a monastic cell 
whose ascetic quality purifies thought and prepares the self for the philosopher’s 
lifetime internalization of the distance from the existent. Philosophical writings by (or 
about) imprisoned thinkers raise a broad and rich set of issues that range from 
illustrating the embodied figure of the public intellectual down to debating 
philosophy’s potential intervention in educating humanity and in shaping the world by 
offering the learning experiences of a positively meant disorientation, a disruption of 
a routinized, automatic course of thought.  
Philosophy thus emerges from such writings as a lived experience and an existential 
choice beyond its frequent reduction to a mere profession or to a protected, armchair 
preoccupation. Or, philosophy personified in prison textuality such as Boethius’s and 
set as an interlocutor becomes the recipient of the philosopher’s relentless questioning 
and self-reflective challenge where boundaries – discursive as well as extra linguistic 
– are in-scribed, de-scribed, and trans-scribed. As Joel Relihan (in this workshop) 
explains, ultimately, the philosopher and philosophy negotiate and at the same time 
parody prose and poetry, thought and politics, life and death. And, as Heidi White, in 
her paper, discusses Boethius along with Job, rather than simply being boundary 
discourses the religious and the philosophical also appear to merge or intersect in 
important ways. Or, philosophy welcomed by the imprisoned African intellectuals and 
acted out as ubuntu (as Mecke Nagel shows in her paper for this workshop) escapes 
the chains of West-imposed boundaries such as the analytic and the continental that 
exclude African philosophy from the disciplinary spectrum. In kicking over such 
traces, philosophy embraces new possibilities of becoming through different 
sensibilities. Or, philosophical openness to another thought, another persuasion, along 
with the pacifist commitments of the philosopher, leads Russell to reading in the cell a 
philosophical text (Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen) in a then banned language 
and of an incriminated origin (German) at the given time (WW1). Ironically, the cell 
and not the university office or the lecture room was the place where a dissident 
Russell could cross more freely and peacefully philosophical boundaries and let his 
philosophical outlook be influenced (perhaps even shaped, despite his well-known 
criticisms of idealism) by a textuality otherwise withdrawn from the public sphere. As 
Andreas Vrahimis in this workshop has shown, the crossing of a divide between 
continental and analytic philosophy that was being formed and was destined to have a 
long future before it was simultaneously performed and deferred, debated and un-
accomplished in a context that led the main protagonists, i.e., the poet T. E. Hulme 
and the philosopher Russell, either to death at war or to imprisonment respectively. 
Yet, though Russell took with him a copy of Husserl’s book to review it in prison, and 
read it, the review was never written, let alone aired, with concatenated effects on the 
crossing of the divide between Anglophone and Germanic philosophy. Significant 
thus has been not only what has been written in the prison space, but also what has 
remained an unfulfilled project conceived just before imprisonment and attempted 
within the prison’s limits, barred by some cause that will remain unknown, and 
doomed to constitute only a counter-factual possibility that was then not pursued.                     
The thinker in prison experiences a spatiality that is heterogeneous to ordinary relative 
rootedness in space, since it breaks with the quotidian lived perception of movement, 
limit, and constantly re-visited locality. The heterogeneous spatiality of the cell 
evoking isolation and ruptured social bonding is often (though not always) effected by 
the asynchronous intellectual temporality of the thinker and her/his world. In simpler 
words, the philosopher thinks somewhat outside (perhaps ahead of) the given time 
that frames the thinking of her/his fellow citizens. The subject has already surrendered 
to the kind of rupture of temporal social synchronization that eventually leads to the 
heterogeneous spatiality of the cell. The philosopher explores alternative possibilities 
of thinking about, acting in and organizing life and society. Some of those different 
idealities and practices trigger the vehement reaction of the society that has been 
philosophically challenged: the case of Socrates is the most emblematic and 
commemorated. But even when the incarceration of the recalcitrant philosophers does 
not lead to their death, that is, in less dramatic instances than those of Socrates or 
Boethius, the rupture of the smooth flow of time-in-society and in-freedom that the 
cell symbolizes mobilizes ever novel philosophical transformations and produces 
multiple effects. In Thoreau’s case, the extremely brief experience of the dystopian 
heterotopia of the prison, i.e., the ‘other’ world that the cell constitutes within the 
world, is felt by the thinker as the appropriate retreat for those who, in a slave owning 
society challenge the institutions of property and taxation. A most influential text, On 
Civil Disobedience
3
 was thus born of a break with the then existing reality the 
retaliation of which was channeled through the quite predictable and unimaginative 
measure of incarceration. The performativity of one’s convictions passes through 
actual conviction and echoes, as Paul Standish in this workshop suggests, a deeper 
ontological-anthropological condition.  
 For some thinkers (e.g. Negri, Stiegler) the ‘why’ of the imprisonment may not stand 
out as a philosophical stake – at least not in the sense that this could be said about 
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Socrates, Boethius, Thoreau or Gramsci. And even when it comes to Negri and 
Stiegler that the reason of their imprisonment can be separated from the category of 
philosophical relevance that we have just discerned does not mean that the reason is 
of the same nature in their cases. But, what is important is that the experience of 
incarceration proved to be a philosophically formative one for both. For Negri,
4
 the 
prison gives rise to thoughts about the solitude of the revolutionary subject and 
internal freedom. For Stiegler, paradoxically lived and thought out as epoche or even 
a no- topos, as a suspension of the world, a bracketing of unreflective rootedness in 
social space, the prison cell becomes the topos and the cause of philosophical 
becoming, the making of a philosopher. As Stiegler himself explains
5
 (and Anna 
Kouppanou accounts in her contribution to this workshop), his experience in prison, 
and his ‘chance to consider this world as does a fish flying, above its element ‒ an 
elementary milieu totally constituted by supplements, where the element, in other 
words, is always lacking’, paved the way for the following discovery. From the 
intimacy of his cell Stiegler began discovering his notions and forming his 
philosophy. In this way, he began to take part in the hypomnesic nature of the world. 
Much has already been indicated about how philosophy re-emerges in the discursive 
space that the closure/closeness of the cell has historically opened up. Philosophy as 
consolation, solace and treatise on happiness, transcendence and worldliness, is the 
only companionable presence in Boethius’s solitude. As a subtext, philosophy 
provides the justification for the worthwhile and beautiful risk for the sake of justice 
that Socrates is willing to undertake. Echoing the uncompromising commitment to 
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action that is conscious of its historico-political import, Gramsci’s philosophy6  
defends the idiom of an ‘impassioned sarcasm’ that does not recoil in horror when the 
dangers of social homeostatic reaction become evident or felt.  
Yet, much more will be left aside – given the length limits of this inaugural text, 
inaugural in its intention to introduce a so far non-thematized topic and to initiate a 
new direction in research rather than exhaust its scope. Hugo Grotius, Marquis de 
Sade, Wittgenstein (who, while in war prison, wrote notes which he later used in his 
Tractatus) are only some of the philosophers whose prison textuality has not been 
addressed either here or in the workshop.
7
  
Finally, another philosophical text written in prison, one that has not been discussed 
either here or in the workshop, must, at least, be mentioned now in these conclusive 
comments. Marginal and largely bypassed in mainstream philosophy, the Memoirs of 
Marie-Jeanne Philippon, known as Madame Roland, is a text about politics and about 
the place of women in the public sphere of the nascent nation-states. It is mentioned 
here neither in a supplementary sense (so that the workshop or the present account 
appear more complete and inclusive) nor as a mere absence in, and lacuna of, the 
workshop that, in being mentioned, shows awareness of limits or of possible angles 
from which this approach might be critiqued as neglectful. On the contrary, its 
mention is recruited here in the conclusive comments precisely to attest to the 
inconclusive character of the workshop, and to the fact that the whole endeavour is to 
be continued. In its exemplarity, it is also mentioned because it illustrates yet another 
broadening of space that the prison cell had paradoxically pointed to. Writing in the 
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closed space of the prison and influenced by Plutarch, Voltaire and Rousseau amongst 
others, Madame Roland envisioned inter alia the kind of enlargement of the public 
space that would accommodate the female philosopher. On the way to execution, 
Madame Roland exclaimed a trans-historical truth, both philosophical and spectral to 
philosophy, one that lies behind many instances of incarceration and/or execution of 
philosophers as well as behind instances of philosophers falling into the worst 
complicities for a cause or an ideology: O Liberté que de crimes on commet en ton 
nom! [Oh, Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!]               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
